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Emotional expressions like damn and bastard seem to bring out
the extreme not only in the speakers who use them, but also
in the linguists who try to account for them: For Potts,
nothing short of a new dimension of meaning can accommodate
these expressions. Potts already in earlier work (Potts,
2003) provides one interesting argument for this view: the
unpluggability (or nondisplaceability) of these expressions in
many cases. Regardless of the position and level of embedding
that that damn bastard John occurs in in a sentence, the speaker
uttering such a sentence conveys that he, the speaker, does not
think all too highly of John. In the present work, Potts still
tries to maintain the core of his earlier theory, but slightly
retreats from his earlier position accepting examples due to
Kratzer and Schlenker where unpluggability is not observed.
Potts’ interesting work raises two related questions from my
perspective: 1) What is the best account for the unpluggability
of expressive content? and 2) Is expressive content a uniform
phenomenon?
Potts’ answer to the first question is to have multiple
dimensions of meaning: Separating pieces of meaning out onto
1different tiers blocks interaction between the pieces easily
and elegantly. Nevertheless, the presuppositional alternative
suggested by Schlenker and Macia seems still worth considering
further despite Potts criticism of it, which is directly linked
to unpluggability. Potts correctly argues, Karttunen in his
1973 paper on presuppositions did not discuss a category of
unpluggable presupposition triggers. However, this does
not prove that such a category could not exist, perhaps on a
different theory of presuppositions. Of course, if such a theory
turned out to be horribly complicated, unpluggable presupposition
triggers might as well not exist from the perspective of
linguistics. However, at least one presuppositional theory that
allows for unpluggability does seem to exist and to be not overly
complicated. Namely, current theories of presuppositions such
as [beaver01] or Heim’s (1982) (and probably other’s as well)
seem to predict such a category of unpluggable, speaker-oriented
presuppositions when combined with a theory of indexicality.
The qualification when combined with a theory of indexicality
is, of course, crucial here – Karttunen’s 1973 theory does
not cover indexicality, and therefore has no way to account
for unpluggability. Now consider though a system with
indexicality. Any account of indexicality would probably do,
but for concreteness assume the following: there is a special
world-time-individual triplet (w0,t0,x0) which is always bound
to the current world of utterance, time of utterance, and the
utterer following Cresswell (1990). Indexical elements like
actually, now, and I refer to components of this triplet. Now
2it is possible to ensure that damn expresses content about the
utterance world, time and speaker. In fact, we could introduce
this in the semantics as in (1a), or in the syntax in a version
where damn takes an explicit evaluation-triplet argument as
in (1b). In both versions, d is required to be an element
of [-1,-0.5] or a similar negative interval to capture strong
dislike (cf. Potts’s (45)).
(1) a. [[ damn]] g = 1 iff. λy ∈ De . g(x0) likes y to degree d in
g(w0) at time g(t0)
b. [[ damn]] g(w,t,x)=1 iff. λy ∈ De . x likes y to degree d
in w at time t
syntactic condition on damn(w,t,x): (w,t,x) must be
the utterance indices
Both versions account for the unpluggability of expressive
content in Potts’ examples. For reasons of space, consider just
Potts’ example (9d) repeated in (2a) on the syntactic account.
(2b) shows how the evalution indices are bound in this example:
The demonstrative that bastard Kresge presupposes that there
is a unique person named Kresge, who the utterer of the current
utterance dislikes in the current world of utterance. Since the
utterer should know whether he dislikes someone, any listener
will add this presupposition to his beliefs about the utterers
preferences to his beliefs.
(2) a. Maybe that bastard Kresge will be late again.
b. Maybe λw that bastard(w0,t0,x0) Kresge will be late
again in w.
3Having unpluggability covered with the various accounts, now
consider some potential ways of distinguishing the accounts
empirically. Of the accounts in (1), the syntactic version (1b)
makes an interesting prediction: Expressive content should make
ad er einterpretation of the entire DP it occurs in obligatory.
This is illustrated in the following scenario involving a
dog-cat confusion: Thomas is owns a big, fat cat, which I
dislike strongly. Furthermore, he is under the misimpression
that his cat is a dog, and is very concerned that it does not
bark. Finally, the cat emits a bark-like sound that makes Thomas
happy. Now consider the German examples in (3) and (4): Without
expressive content, both a de re and a de dicto interpretation
are possible: use of Hund requires the de dicto interpretation,
while Katze requires the de re interpretation.
(3) Thomas
Thomas
freut
enjoys
sich,
self
dass
that
sein
his
Hund/seine
dog/his
Katze
cat
gebellt
barked
hat.
has
‘Thomas is happy that his dog has barked.’
However, when a DP also contains expressive content, the de dicto
interpretation is no longer possible as shown by (4a). (4a)
entails that the speaker believes that Thomas has a dog.
(4) a. #Thomas
Thomas
freut
enjoys
sich,
self
dass
that
sein
his
verdammter
damn
Hund
dog
gebellt
barked
hat.
has
‘Thomas is happy that his damn dog barked.’
4b. Thomas
Thomas
freut
pleases
sich,
self
dass
that
seine
his
verdammte
damn
Katze
cat
gebellt
barked
hat.
has
‘Thomas is happy that his damn cat barked.’
The syntactic account of damn (4) predicts the difference in
(4) because the conditions on the indexing of evaluation triplets
of Percus (2000) apply to LF-structures on this theory. This
requires that adjective and noun in the same noun phrase must be
coindexed. Since the evaluation triplet of verdammt must be the
utterance triplet, Hund must apply to the same triplet. This
predicts the obligatory de re interpretation of (4a). As far
as I can see neither Potts’ analysis nor the semantic version of
damn above predicts the obligatory de re-effect in the same way.
Now consider shiftability, though. I believe it shows that
none of accounts under consideration is appropriate because
shiftability shows that there are different kinds of expressive
content. At the one end, we find non-linguistic gestures;
emotional ones like angry tone of voice or unemotional ones like
a downward-spiraling gesture. Both of these can shift in direct
speech, but need not, as illustrated by (5). The spiraling
gesture can either be also quoted from a gesture John made, or
it can contain information John is unware of.
(5) John said "Bill went down the stairs". (“went down”
accompanied by downward-spiraling gesture of the speaker)
In contrast to non-linguistic gestural information,
emotional/evaluative expressive content must shift in direct
5speech as illustrated by (6). (6) entails that Thomas doesn’t
like the dog.
(6) Thomas
Thomas
hat
has
erzählt:
narrated
“Der
the
verdammte
damn
Köter
dog
hat
has
gebellt.”
barked
‘Thomas said: “The damn dog has barked.”
In indirect speech, on the other hand, this kind of expressive
content rarely shifts, but somes does as illustrated by (7): (7)
could be used by a speaker who loves the relevant dog, as long as
Thomas does not.
(7) Thomas
Thomas
hat
has
erzählt,
narrated
dass
that
der
the
verdammte
damn
Köter
dog
gebellt
barked
habe.
have-subj
Thomas said that the damn dog barked.
However, in free indirect speech the content of verdammte Köter
shifts again obligatorily as in direct speech. Therefore,
(8) can only be used if Thomas dislikes the relevant dog – the
speaker, however, could like the dog.
(8) Der
the
verdammte
damn
Köter
dog
habe
have-subj
gebellt
barked
erzählte
narrated
Thomas.
Thomas
‘The damn dog had belled, Thomas said.’
Other kinds of so-called expressive content, however, behave
differently, especially in free indirect speech. One example,
are the formal pronouns of address of German which Potts takes up
in this paper. These must shift in direct speech.
(9) Ann
Ann
sagte
said
zu
to
Thomas:
Thomas
“Jan
Jan
hat
has
mir
me
von
of
Ihnen
you.formal
erzählt.”
told
6‘Ann told Thomas: “Jan has told me a lot about you
(formal)."
However, in free indirect speech the politeness cannot shift
as (10) illustrates: The pronoun ihnen in (10) refers to the
current addressee and indicates that the current speaker is
not on familiar terms with. Ann and Thomas do not affect the
reference of ihnen or use of the polite form.
(10) Jan
Jan
habe
have
mir
me
von
of
Ihnen
you.formal
erzählt
told
sagte
said
Ann
Ann
zu
to
Thomas.
Thomas
‘Jan had told me about you, said Ann to Thomas.’
The contrast in shiftability between (8) and (10) is unexpected
from an account like Potts’ or the ones sketched above that treat
polite pronouns in the same way as emotional expressive content:
Such uniform accounts predict that (8) and (10) should behave
identical.
Further categories with respect to shiftability may exist:
In other work, Potts furthermore assumes appositive relative to
expressive content (Potts, 2003). Appositives shift optionally
in free indirect speech in German: either Thomas or I could be
the ones not liking the dog in (11).
(11) Der
the
Hund,
dog
den
who
ich
I
übrigens
by the way
nicht
not
leiden
stand
kann,
can
habe
have-subj
gebellt,
barked
erzählte
narrated
Thomas.
Thomas
‘The dog, which I can’t stand by the way, had belled, said
Thomas.’
To conclude then, I do not think a satisfactory account of
expressive content has been proposed. The shiftability data make
7a more flexible account necessary than the three I considered.
In some cases, we might find different syntactic-semantic
mechanisms for types of expressive content: This seems plausible
for formality, which could be analyzed at the level of a
phrasal register, rather than at the lexical level, where the
accounts considered here applied. However, dividing up types of
expressive content into types and describing the shiftability of
each type, would be not explanatory. It would be more satisfying
to find general pragmatic principles predicting the shiftability
and unpluggability. For example, for emotional/evaluative
adjectives like damn, an account just like other adjectives might
be feasible combined with the following pragmatic principle:
the individual strong emotional content is attributed to must
be unambiguously recoverable unless it is the speaker of the
utterance. Such a principle would also explain why often the
emotionally extreme expressions are unpluggable and resist
shift. The work that is needed is systematic empirical work
comparing indexicality and expressive content in a variety of
constructions.
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